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Congestible Intellectual Property and Impure 
Public Goods 
By David W. Barnes* 
¶1  Public goods theory has for decades been the dominant economic foundation for 
intellectual property law.  Recently, scholars have suggested that some intellectual 
property information possesses the characteristics of impure public goods—goods that 
only to some extent share the non-rivalry characteristics of public goods.  Public goods 
theory was developed in the context of publically provided goods, and associated policy 
prescriptions provide little practical guidance for the regulating modern private market 
provision of intellectual property.  Impure public goods theory is even less helpful in 
identifying the optimal balance between exclusive rights to creators and access by others 
who would benefit from that information.  Informed by impure public goods theory, 
however, an approach comparing the net benefits of increasing incentives and increasing 
access can inform intellectual property policy. 
¶2  This Article explores the non-rivalry characteristics of impure public goods and the 
associated policy implications for intellectual property law.  It concludes that the 
consumption of information about the expressions of ideas protected by copyright law 
and about the sources and characteristics of goods and services embodied in symbols 
protected by trademark law can be partially rivalrous.  This Article applies a net benefit 
test to examples of impure public goods suggested by various scholars.  It concludes that, 
on balance, partial rivalry does not support proposals for strengthening exclusive rights. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶3  The conventional economics of intellectual property law is based on public goods 
theory.  The information embodied in intellectual property has two characteristics that 
distinguish it from tangible property.  Like other public goods, copyrighted expressions 
and patented inventions are non-rivalrous and non-excludable.1  Recently, scholars have 
argued that trademarked symbols also share these properties.2  If a good is non-rivalrous, 
 
* Distinguished Research Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. 
1 See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 41–42 (2003) (arguing that the distinguishing features of information as property 
are non-rivalrousness and non-excludability); Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual 
Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 457–58 (2010) 
(characterizing modern intellectual property scholars as rejecting traditional law associated with physical 
property because information is non-rivalrous and non-excludable);. 
2 There has been some scholarly disagreement on whether trademarks are public goods. Compare Stephen 
L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 762 (1990) (“A trademark is not a public good 
. . . .”), William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & 
ECON. 265, 268–74 (1987) (“A proper trademark is not a public good; it has social value only when used to 
designate a single brand.”), and Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual 
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 143 (2004) (stating, with respect to trademarks, that “there is no public 
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“it is costless to allow additional consumers simultaneously to enjoy the benefits of a 
public good once it has been produced.”3  If a good is “non-excludable,” it is difficult for 
producers to get consumers to pay for the privilege of using it.4 
¶4  Intellectual property law is usefully conceptualized as promoting the development 
and dissemination of information.  The information may concern new machines or 
compositions of matter in patent law, original ways to express ideas in copyright law, or 
the characteristics of goods and services in trademark law.  If the information is non-
rivalrous, it is desirable for many to have access to the benefits of public goods for free.  
Free access to non-rivalrous goods is desirable because, once the goods have been 
produced, they may be supplied without cost to additional consumers.   
¶5  When public goods are provided by private enterprise, the free access goal conflicts 
with the need to encourage production of public goods.   Competitive markets rely on 
incentives provided by profit-making opportunities and positive prices.   Without the 
incentive provided by the potential to earn profits, competitive markets provide 
insufficient incentives for creative activity.5  Intellectual property law creates limited 
enforceable rights to charge users of patented innovations, copyrighted expressions, and 
trademarked symbols and thereby recoup the costs of supplying that information.  
Intellectual property law addresses the problem created by the lack of incentives, which 
would otherwise deprive the public of the benefits of information. 
¶6  Complicating the analysis is the presence of “impure” public goods, goods that are 
partially rivalrous, partially excludable, or both.  This Article focuses on partially 
rivalrous or “congestible” intellectual property, information for which some simultaneous 
uses by consumers interfere with the benefits consumers derive from their uses.  A 
highway is partially rivalrous.  But too much traffic congests the road and slows down 
everyone’s progress.  Too many trucks make the journey less pleasant for occupants of 
 
goods problem for intellectual property to solve”), with David W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademark, 
5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 22 (2006) (arguing that the non-rivalrousness and non-excludability 
characteristics of copyrighted expressions and patented inventions applies to trademarked symbols as well).  
Among other recent scholarly works attributing public goods characteristics to trademarks are Sonia K. 
Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601, 1607 (2010); William M. Landes, Posner on 
Beanie Babies, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1761, 1772 (2007); Ian J. Block, Comment, Hidden Whois and 
Infringing Domain Names: Making the Case for Registrar Liability, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 431, 434 
(2008); Margaret Ritzert, Comment, Champagne Is from Champagne: An Economic Justification for 
Extending Trademark-Level Protection to Wine-Related Geographical Indicators, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 191, 214 
(2009).  Yet scholars continue to treat copyright and patents as “public goods” while treating trademarks as, 
apparently, some other kind of information. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Food Forethought: Intergenerational 
Equity and Global Food Supply—Past, Present, and Future, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 399, 421 (2011) 
(“Copyrights and patents have been reframed as ‘public goods’ and trademarks have been characterized as 
information proxies that reduce search costs to consumers.”). 
3 David W. Barnes, The Incentives/Access Tradeoff, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 96, 98–99 (2010).  In 
addition, “[p]ublic goods are not classified as ‘public’ simply because they are supplied by the government.  
Rather, some goods are classified as ‘public’ because their characteristics of non-rivalrousness in 
consumption and non-excludability in production inevitably prevent efficient private market supply.” Id. at 
99 n.16. 
4 Id. at 99. 
5 Barnes, supra note 2, at 39–40; Mark Cooper, From Wifi to Wikis and Open Source: The Political 
Economy of Collaborative Production in the Digital Information Age, 5 J. [TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.] 
125, 128–29 (2006); Ritzert, supra note 2, at 214–15. 
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cars.  If there are few users, however, no one interferes with each other’s travel.  Could 
intellectual property information be at least partially rivalrous? 
¶7  Recent scholarly literature has identified examples of congestibility in copyright 
and trademark law.6  Users who distort the meaning of a copyrighted figure, by casting 
the noble Mickey Mouse as a villain, for instance, or using the “Victoria’s Secret” 
trademark for a sex shop, deprive the creator of the information and consumers of the 
clear message the expression or source-indicator once conveyed.  This Article explores 
the policy implications of these and other claims that partial rivalry interferes with the 
proper functioning of intellectual property law. 
¶8  Public finance economists recognize the pervasiveness of impure public goods in 
the world and have developed a theory of impure public goods that modifies the 
normative prescriptions of pure public goods theory.7  These normative prescriptions, 
however, have their roots in collective, rather than market, provision of goods.  This 
Article expands the pure and impure public goods theory derived from public finance 
theory to private market supply of intellectual property.  The policy implications of these 
“impurities” have not been systematically explored. 
¶9  Because non-rivalry is the basis for the free access norm, it would seem that less 
free access is appropriate for more rivalrous goods.  This means that a consumer whose 
consumption of information imposes costs on others ought to pay more than if his 
consumption were costless.  In application to specific intellectual property issues, 
however, the analysis should consider the interrelationship between incentives and 
access.  Increasing incentives may not produce creative work that is more valuable than 
what free access would produce.  Analogously, expanded free access may not be more 
valuable than the creative work that foregone incentives would otherwise encourage. 
¶10  Applying net benefit analysis to various contemporary intellectual property issues, 
this Article suggests that recent proposals for extensions of intellectual property rights on 
the assumption that information is an impure public good are ill founded.  Some 
extensions of rights due to partially rivalrous uses of information, such as congestibility 
of copyright and dilution of trademark, are unlikely to improve incentives in any way that 
would result in greater creative activity. 
¶11  Part II considers the extent to which intellectual property information falls short of 
the model of pure public goods.  It concludes that there are good reasons for accepting 
that many types of intellectual property are partially rivalrous and, therefore, impure 
public goods.  In particular, it concludes that uses of information about expressions of 
ideas protected by copyright law and about sources and characteristics of goods protected 
by trademark law may be partially rivalrous. 
¶12  Part III compares prescriptive rules from pure and impure public goods theory.  
When applied to market provision of intellectual property information, these rules require 
 
6 See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 2, at 25 (arguing trademarks are congestible impure public goods); Michele 
Boldrin & David K. Levine, Market Structure and Property Rights in Open Source Industries, 30 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 325 (2005) (discussing congestible copyright); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and 
Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (2007). See also infra notes 
40–43 and accompanying text. 
7 See generally RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND 
CLUB GOODS 143–239 (2d ed. 1996). 
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comparing the incremental benefits arising from information creation resulting from 
increased rights with the incremental benefits arising from increased access.  Part III-A 
describes the conventional rules for analyzing the optimal scope of intellectual property 
law as lacking practical utility.  As an alternative, Part III-B offers a net benefit test first 
developed in the context of pure public goods8 to address the examples of impure public 
goods identified in Part II.  Parts III-C and III-D explore the policy impact of relaxing the 
assumption that intellectual property information is partially rivalrous in copyright and 
trademark law, respectively.  Public finance theory suggests that public provision of 
public goods optimally requires that users of resources pay for the costs they impose on 
others.9  Private market provision of intellectual property information, however, requires 
additional consideration of the effect on incentives because governmental expenditure 
provides necessary incentives in the public finance context.  Applying the net benefit 
approach, there seems to be little support in impure public goods theory for expanding 
exclusive rights to account for partial rivalrousness in copyright or trademark. 
¶13  Part III concludes that impurities identified by scholars as arising in copyright and 
trademark law are of no particular import to intellectual property policy.  The notion of 
congestible copyright seems originally to have been suggested by Professor Landes and 
Judge Posner.10  There is little incentive-based justification for preventing expressions of 
ideas that have become famous cultural icons beyond the extent necessary to encourage 
their initial creation.  Similarly, there is little support from a net benefits perspective for 
the protection of trademarks against congesting, non-confusing, diluting uses, as 
famously suggested by Frank Schechter11 and recognized in the Lanham Act.12  By 
contrast, protection against confusing source-indicating uses of trademarks, which is to 
say, rivalrous uses, is entirely and appropriately based on the negative incentive effects 
on creators and reduction in benefits to consumers from confusing simultaneous use of 
source-identifying information. 
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFORMATION AS IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS 
¶14  Public goods theory provides a theoretical basis for determining how much of a 
non-rivalrous good the government should supply.13  It is part of a larger theory of public 
finance,14 which also explores how the government should pay for that production.15  The 
government could produce public goods itself, pay or subsidize others who would do the 
 
8 See generally Barnes, supra note 3. 
9 See sources cited infra note 70. 
10 See Landes & Posner, supra note 6. 
11 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 831–32 (1927). 
12 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2009). 
13 This work was first formalized by Professor Paul Samuelson in a famous trio of articles:  Paul A. 
Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REV. ECON. & STAT. 332 (1958); Paul A. 
Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. & STAT. 350 
(1955); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954) 
[hereinafter Samuelson, Pure Theory]. 
14 For an overview of public finance economics in general and public goods theory as it relates to public 
finance, see RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
(5th ed. 1989). 
15 See id. at 211–313. 
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work, or rely on independent economic actors to produce public goods.  For the 
production of intellectual property, Western industrialized nations typically choose the 
third alternative and rely on the creative activity of independent economic actors prodded 
by economic incentives.  A supplier of a good or service chooses among alternative 
trademark devices to indicate that it is the source of products bearing that mark.  An 
author creates and fixes in a tangible medium her own expression.  An inventor conceives 
of and describes his own novel process or composition of matter.  Relying on individuals 
and competitive markets to supply public goods means that the government does not have 
to pay for the supply of intellectual property.  Creators seek returns in the marketplace. 
¶15  Opting for the private supply of public intellectual property goods presents a 
unique challenge to public goods theory.  Government supply of public goods means the 
government will avoid markets and figure out the optimal level of government provision 
through the political process.  Private supply requires that intellectual property rights be 
designed to yield the optimal supply of public goods through private markets.  The 
challenge is to provide correct incentives that encourage production without unduly 
restricting consumption. 
¶16  Even though public goods theory focuses on collective supply, it now dominates 
the economic theory of the private supply of intellectual property.16  Pure public goods, 
however they are supplied, are non-rivalrous in consumption and non-excludable in 
production.17  “Non-rivalrous” has been defined in a variety of ways converging on the 
following:  a good is non-rivalrous “when a unit of the good can be consumed by one 
individual without detracting, in the slightest, from the consumption opportunities still 
available to others from that same unit.”18  Many can use information about how to build 
 
16 The intellectual property literature is so rife with reference to public goods that it is difficult to collect 
them all, but for recent examples, see John P. Conley & Christopher S. Yoo, Nonrivalry and Price 
Discrimination in Copyright Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1801 (2009); Alan Devlin, Indeterminism and 
the Property-Patent Equation, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 96 (2009); Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, 
Self-Realizing Inventions and the Utilitarian Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897, 952 
(2009); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright, Private Copying, and Discrete Public Goods, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 1 (2009); Ariel Simon, Reinventing Discovery: Patent Law’s Characterizations of and 
Interventions upon Science, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2175, 2182 (2009). See sources collected at David W. 
Barnes, One Trademark Per Source, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 12 n.55 (2009) [hereinafter Barnes, One 
Trademark]; Barnes, supra note 2, at 23 n.2; see also sources cited supra note 2. 
17 See Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations: 
A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 440 (1998), and sources cited therein (“As a starting 
point, public or collective goods and services can be divided into two categories:  pure public goods and 
services and impure, or mixed, public goods and services.  Both categories are characterized by features of 
availability to an indefinite class of beneficiaries, and of the inability to force the public to directly pay a 
sufficient price to induce the production in the private marketplace.  Pure public goods and services are 
characterized by nonrivalry—that is, ‘one person’s consumption of the good does not interfere with its 
availability to others’—and by nonexcludability—that is, no person can be excluded from consumption of 
the good or service even if unwilling to pay for it (a ‘free-rider’).”) (citations omitted); see also Joseph A. 
Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions Are Not Enough: The Significance of Opportunism, Candor and 
Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223, 344 
n.246 (2002) (“A public good is characterized by two features:  non-rivalrous consumption (i.e., 
consumption by one person does not generally preclude or exhaust the ability of others to consume the 
good) and allocative non-excludability (i.e., an inability to capture the economic benefits of supplying the 
good after it is produced).”). 
18 CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 7, at 8.  By contrast, a good is non-excludable if it is impossible, 
extremely difficult, or prohibitively expensive to prevent people from using the good once it is produced. 
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a machine, to express an idea, or to identify goods from a particular source without 
interfering with each other’s use in the slightest.  The bit of information supplied by its 
creator, whether it is information about the source of goods, how to express an idea, or 
how to produce a new machine, is the public good.  The public good in intellectual 
property is information—the idea transformed by the creative process into something 
from which people may benefit. 
¶17  In other substantive areas, legal scholars have routinely objected to treating goods 
that are partially rivalrous and partially excludable as pure public goods.  Mostly 
referring to the fact that goods are rivalrous to some extent, they have observed that 
“most of the real economy operate[s] in the messy world of impure public goods”19 and 
that “[p]ure public goods are uncommon.”20  Some claim that no real-world good 
qualifies as a pure public good.21  Nevertheless, many goods have characteristics similar 
to pure public goods in that they are non-rivalrous to some extent or among some classes 
of users.22  It is useful to refer to all of these partially rivalrous goods as impure public 
goods. 
¶18  Scholars identify a variety of reasons why some types of intellectual property are 
impure public goods.  Parts II-A and II-B discuss those impurities arising from partially 
rivalrous use of copyright and trademark information.  Congestible intellectual property 
goods are those where simultaneous use by others does detract, to some extent, from the 
benefits still available to others from the intellectual property information.  Congestibility 
is occasionally mentioned in the intellectual property literature and allied fields23 and is 
 
See ADAM GIFFORD, JR. & GARY J. SANTONI, PUBLIC ECONOMICS: POLITICIANS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND 
EXCHANGE 32 (1979) (“A characteristic of some public goods (and some private goods) is that, once the 
good is produced, it is extremely costly to prevent individuals from consuming the good.”) (emphasis 
added); see also CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 7, at 9 (stating that goods are non-excludable if “once 
they are provided, it is difficult, if not impossible, to exclude individuals from their benefits”). 
19 Peter Drahos, The Regulation of Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 321, 321–22 (2004) (referring to 
congestibility in the context of international law and technology transfer). 
20 Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Induced Litigation, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 545, 554 (2004) (referring to 
congestibility in the allocation of resources to courts and judges); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2003) (referring to overexploitation, 
crowding, congestibility of private lands in the context of land conservation and preservation). 
21 See Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit and Voice: User Participation in the Production of Local Public 
Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1, 7 n.16 (2001) (discussing the provision of education and neighborhood security) 
(“Strictly speaking, no good or service fits the extreme or polar definition in any genuinely descriptive 
sense. . . .  The standard examples such as national defense come reasonably close to descriptive purity, but 
even here careful consideration normally dictates some relaxation of the strict polar assumption.”) (citing 
JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS 49–50 (1968)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); KIERON WALSH, PUBLIC SERVICES AND MARKET MECHANISMS 7 (1995) (“noting that pure 
public goods are ‘difficult to discover’ and discussing the argument ‘that there is no such thing as a public 
good in an objective sense, and that it is a purely cultural construct”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
22 See Fennell, supra note 21, at 7 n.16 (stating that “goods clearly vary in their degree of ‘publicness’”).  
“Although it is not easy to think of examples of physically consumed, pure public goods, one can easily list 
goods that seem similar to public goods over some range of the number of customers.” Id. (quoting 
RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 19 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
23 Scholars who rely heavily on the congestibility of intellectual property in their work include:  Michael 
Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33 (2004); 
Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 
317 (2005); Barnes, supra note 2; Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and 
Vol. 9:8] David W. Barnes 
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much more common in environmental and natural resources scholarship.24  From other 
areas of law, one sees examples such as Old Faithful,25 the Washington Monument,26 
roads,27 courts,28 fisheries,29 rivers,30 pastures,31 and air32 as being congestible.  Roads 
seem to be the best example of a congestible public good because the phenomenon 
resulting from too many people on the road is called “congestion.”  Some small number 
of simultaneous users of a road may not diminish the utility of the road to others at all.  A 
sufficiently large number, however, increases the chance of accidents, slows speeds, 
induces road rage, delays people, and imposes costs in terms of wasted productive time.  
The road example gives the basic idea of partially rivalrous simultaneous use by 
increasing numbers of people.  Expressions of ideas and source-indicating symbols are 
potentially congestible if uses conflict by diminishing the expression or symbol’s ability 
to convey information.  No one has suggested that information about novel inventions is 
 
Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005); Dennis S. Karjala, Congestion Externalities and 
Extended Copyright Protection, 94 GEO. L.J. 1065 (2006); Landes & Posner, supra note 6, at 484; Yoo, 
supra note 6; Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
179 (2008); Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847 
(2006). C.f. Lemley, supra note 2, at 142–43 (“The question here is why we should want to reduce the use 
and distribution of information when there is no public goods problem for intellectual property to solve.”). 
24 See, e.g., Michael A. Hyman, Under the Danube Canopy: The Future of International Waterway Law, 23 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 355–56 (1998) (“Purely public goods are goods that are non-
excludable and non-rival.  On the other end of the spectrum are private goods, which are fully excludable 
and rival.  In between purely public and purely private goods, two other types of goods exist:  impure 
public goods, which are non-excludable yet rival; and common-pool resources, which are partially 
excludable and rival.”) (footnotes omitted); Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on 
Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 140, 185, 185 n.261 (1999) (“A public good is characterized as 
congestible when so many people consume the same fixed quantity of that good simultaneously that they 
will interfere with the benefit derived by each user.”) (citing Robert P. Inman, A Generalized Congestion 
Function for Highway Travel, 5 J. URBAN ECON. 21 (1978)). 
25 Michael Braunstein, Natural Environments and Natural Resources: An Economic Analysis and New 
Interpretation of the General Mining Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1133, 1188 n.310 (1985).  Professor 
Braunstein describes the geyser “Old Faithful” as being a mixed public good because one can only observe 
the geyser from the official viewing area, which can accommodate only a limited number of people.  After 
a certain point, an additional person’s presence in the viewing area may prevent others from entering.  
From that perspective, Old Faithful is mixed in the sense that it is congestible. 
26 George & Guthrie, supra note 20, at 554–55. 
27 S.E. Holtermann, Externalities and Public Goods, 39 ECONOMICA 78, 81–83 (1972) (describing goods 
like roads and courts as mixed cases of public goods).  Both roads and courts are congestible because, as 
more people use them, access to them and, particularly with roads, the benefits derived from them wane.  
These examples are mixed in the sense of being both congestible and offering a combination of private 
benefits (to the litigants, in the example of courts) and non-rivalrous benefits to the public (in the form of 
non-violent dispute resolution or legal precedents). 
28 Id. 
29 See, e.g., Claire Moore Dickerson, Cycles and Pendulums: Good Faith, Norms, and the Commons, 54 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 399, 433 n.131 (1997); Franz Xaver Perrez, The Efficiency of Cooperation: A 
Functional Analysis of Sovereignty, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 515, 552 (1998). 
30 See, e.g., Perrez, supra note 29, at 552. 
31 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 20, at 11. 
32 Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative 
Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 391 (1991). 
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congestible.33  The policy implications of treating intellectual property as pure or impure 
public goods are discussed in Part III. 
A. Copyright Congestion 
¶19  Copyrighted expression may be rivalrous in several ways.  Professor William 
Landes and Judge Richard Posner famously described the problem of overuse of the 
Mickey Mouse character, which is copyrighted by the Walt Disney Company.34  If 
anyone could use the Mickey Mouse character without Disney’s permission, “[n]ot only 
would the public rapidly tire of Mickey Mouse, but his image would be blurred, as some 
authors portrayed him as a Casanova, others as cat meat, others as an animal-rights 
advocate, still others as the henpecked husband of Minnie.”35  Landes and Posner referred 
to this as a “congestion” or “copyright overuse” externality.36 
¶20  Analytically, it is useful to distinguish between the simple “over-reproduction” type 
of overuse that causes the public to tire of the image and “transformative” overuse that 
blurs the image.  Consider a graphic artist whose unique style leads many to desire copies 
of her work.  The artist may produce and sell an original, then artist’s proofs, then 
lithographic prints, and then unlimited posters of her work.  Others may reproduce that 
work, adding to the supply.  At some point, the ubiquity of the art resulting from “over-
reproduction” may diminish its uniqueness and therefore its appeal—the utility a 
consumer derives from the copy.  A consumer would likely derive less pleasure from 
wearing her Mickey Mouse watch if everyone wore one. 
¶21  By contrast, the transformative, blurring use does not reproduce the image exactly; 
it transforms the image in a way that conveys a different idea.  A consumer would be 
more reluctant to wear or buy a Mickey Mouse watch if another author had transformed 
the image into a mouse who physically abuses his romantic partner.  Because there may 
be additional value in the creative work of transformation, the analysis of simple copying 
in Part III of this Article differs from the analysis of blurring. 
¶22  In either case, however, the simultaneous use by additional users imposes a cost on 
other consumers, just as, after some point, additional cars on the highway cause 
congestion.  The blurring use, however, may interfere more significantly with the benefits 
others derive from simple overuse, just as a convoy of tractor-trailer trucks interferes 
more with my use of a road than an equal number of other cars.  Thus, it is quite possible 
that some types of users may be more congesting users (those who distort Mickey’s 
persona for their own commercial purposes) while others have less of an effect on 
another’s use (people who merely reproduce the expression).37 
 
33 It has been suggested that the use of information about new inventions is rivalrous, Devlin & Sukhatme, 
supra note 16, at 915, but only because another person’s uncompensated use of the information deprives 
the creator of revenues.  That is different from saying that the utility of the invention diminishes. 
34 Landes & Posner, supra note 6, at 483 (referring to Disney’s support for the Sonny Bono Act that 
extended its copyright on Mickey Mouse by twenty years); see also Boldrin & Levine, supra note 6; 
Karjala, supra note 23 (discussing congestibility in the context of copyright law and disagreeing with 
Landes and Posner’s conclusions). 
35 Landes & Posner, supra note 6, at 487–88. 
36 Id. at 486–88. 
37 There is some dissent from this view that congestion makes some public goods “impure.”  Professor 
Christopher Yoo correctly observes that the original definition of a public good was one that appeared in 
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B. Trademark Congestion 
¶23  It was long believed that trademarks were private rather than public goods.38  This 
cannot be true, as many consumers can simultaneously use a supplier’s trademark 
referentially (to refer to the trademark owner’s goods) without diminishing the benefits 
each derives.  On the other hand, simultaneous source-indicating use of a mark by a 
business competitor would diminish the utility derived by the mark owner and 
consumers, for whom locating the goods would be more difficult.  The basis for dilution 
law is that source-indicating uses of a mark by non-competitors diminish the utility of a 
mark even if consumers are not confused.  Because some uses of trademark information 
are non-rivalrous while others are partially rivalrous, trademarks are impure public goods 
rather than private goods.39 
¶24  A number of scholars have considered whether trademarks are subject to overuse.  
Some dismiss it as a concern,40 while others associate “overuse” with non-source-
indicating uses that lead to trademark genericide.41  Other scholars refer to a trademark 
problem related to congestion without distinguishing partially rivalrous uses with strictly 
 
“the same quantity . . . in more than one person’s consumption function.” Yoo, supra note 6, at 638.  While 
congestion may reduce the utility each consumer enjoys as the number of simultaneous users increases, as 
traditional economics of public goods recognizes, the same quantity of the good is still available.  “Strictly 
speaking, then, congestion is not a relaxation of the assumption that goods are nonrival.” Id at 676.  This 
approach is very useful to Yoo’s models suggesting that “impure public goods are susceptible to efficient 
market production under a wide range of circumstances.” Id. at 715.  Nevertheless, the original definition 
also assumed that “each individual’s consumption of [a pure public good] leads to no subtraction from any 
other individual’s consumption of that good,” Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 13, at 387, and the 
conditions for determining the optimal supply of public goods depend on the utility or benefit consumers 
derive from the goods, because all consumers’ marginal rates of substitution between goods depends on the 
utility they derive from each. Id. (deriving optimal conditions based on the utility consumers derive from 
consumption and the costs of producing goods).  Because the fundamental economic problem for 
intellectual property law is broadening exclusive rights until the additional benefits from greater creative 
activity no longer exceed the additional benefits from free access, see infra Part III, the magnitude of 
benefits obtained by consumers is relevant.  While Yoo’s focus may be productive in his analysis, it does 
not eliminate congestibility as a source of concern for intellectual property theory or policy, as Part III 
discusses. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 
1051 n.82, 1055–56 (2005) (suggesting that while copyrights were pure public goods, the possibility that 
iconic images might be congested through blurring overuse might be an exception). 
38 See sources cited supra note 2. 
39 Elsewhere, I have written that competing source-indicating (proprietary) uses of trademark information 
are rivalrous in the way that private goods are rivalrous.  This is not strictly correct.  A business 
competitor’s source-indicating use of a trademark does not completely destroy the utility of the mark to the 
mark owner or consumers.  A trademark is not like the bite of an apple, which, once chewed and 
swallowed, is of no use to anyone else. Barnes, supra note 2, at 45–46 (“Competitors’ proprietary uses of 
another’s mark are likely to be incompatible, reflecting the characteristics of private, rivalrous goods.  As 
public goods, trademarks are indeed mixed in character.”). 
40 Karjala, supra note 23, at 1074–75, 1075 n.19. 
41 ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, 
APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 79–82 (1998); see also Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 905 
(9th Cir. 2007) (“Where the majority of the relevant public appropriates a trademark term as the name of a 
product (or service), the mark is a victim of ‘genericide’ and trademark rights generally cease.”). 
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rival uses42 or refer to trademarks as a public good subject to congestion without further 
analysis.43  The congestion in the trademark context is analogous to congestion of 
copyrighted expressions in that the image—the information conveyed by the mark—
might be blurred. 
1. Confusing Proprietary Use 
¶25  The trademark use that most directly interferes with the benefits others derive from 
trademarks is confusing proprietary use.  Proprietary use of a trademark is use by a 
supplier of goods and services to indicate that it is the source of all goods of that type 
bearing that trademark.  Both the mark owner and a trademark infringer engage in 
proprietary uses.  The infringer’s use is a confusing proprietary use; it deceptively 
indicates that the infringing supplier is the source of all goods of that type bearing that 
trademark.  If an upstart cell phone company uses Apple’s iPhone mark on its products, 
the utility of the information conveyed by that symbol, both to the mark owner and to 
consumers, diminishes. 
¶26  The information conveyed by a trademark is usually not totally destroyed by 
confusing proprietary use but may be greatly diminished, depending on how many 
consumers are confused by the upstart’s use.  The information content of the symbol is 
diminished, changing from “this is the cell phone associated with a particular source” to 
“this may be the cell phone supplied by a particular source.”  There are few, if any, 
infringement cases where the infringer’s use has totally destroyed consumers’ ability to 
locate goods supplied by the owner of the mark.  If the mislabeling is so pervasive that 
consumers can no longer fruitfully glean any information from the mark, however, the 
trademark is like a highway that is so congested that there is gridlock. 
2. Non-Confusing Proprietary Use 
¶27  The most well-known congestible uses of trademarks are associated with trademark 
dilution.  In another work, I discussed the General Motors Cadillac mark and the Exxon 
mark as examples of situations in which the proprietary use by some others might be 
congesting, decreasing the source-indicating utility of the mark even if no confusion 
about the source resulted from use.44  General Motors (GM) has successfully associated 
Cadillac with “luxury.”  A low quality dog food supplier’s non-confusing proprietary use 
of “Cadillac” is unlikely to confuse consumers about the source of the goods and may 
give the dog food manufacturer some marketing advantage.  But this use might blur the 
association of Cadillac with luxury, even if buyers knew that GM was not the source of 
the dog food.  Consumers would have to consider context before understanding whether 
 
42 See, e.g., Igor Dubinsky, The Race to the Box Office Leads to Cinematic Déjà Vu: Modifying Copyright 
Law to Minimize Rent Dissipation and Copyright Redundancy at the Movies, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 405, 
408 n.16 (2007). 
43 See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Pills, Patents, and Power: State Creation of Gray Markets as a Limit on Patent 
Rights, 53 FLA. L. REV. 789, 797 (2001) (“For example, trademarks are public goods, but if the trademark 
becomes overused it loses its value as an indicator of source and quality.  Too much use imposes the 
equivalent of congestion costs that diminish the value of the good.”). 
44 See Barnes, supra note 2, at 34–35 (discussing the General Motors and Exxon examples). 
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to associate the dog food with “luxury” and whether to associate it with General Motors.  
The term’s referential utility would be diminished. 
¶28  A variation of this problem arises when suppliers of goods and services use their 
markets to build their goodwill without reference to their products.  Exxon/Mobil 
Corporation promotes an association with a cleaner environment in advertisements that 
include the trademark but do not mention any particular product.  Such advertising would 
no longer redound to its corporate image if an unrelated seller of shoes used the Exxon 
mark.  The owner of the Schweppes mark used in connection with carbonated beverages 
ran a series of advertisements containing political cartoons with the following words 
written in the bottom corner on a yellow banner:  “Sch . . . you know who.”45  Because 
the mark was not used in connection with any particular product in that ad, readers might 
not have known (or would have had to work harder to appreciate) to whom the words in 
the yellow banner referred if suppliers of unrelated goods could use the mark.  The 
referential meaning of the mark would again have been reduced despite the lack of 
competition or confusion about the source of a particular product.  The utility of the mark 
to both the senior user of the mark and consumers would have been congested. 
¶29  If blurring from either of these types of congesting uses is more than a theoretical 
possibility, the type of harm to the trademark owners is apparent.  They might have to 
invest more in marketing to maintain the clarity of their signal or might lose trade, as 
consumers have to search harder to determine whether a particular use is indicating the 
manufacturer of the famous luxury vehicles or the “environment-friendly” petroleum 
products.  The policy question arises when both producers and consumers need to be 
protected from these congesting uses in order to augment suppliers’ incentives to invest 
in trademarks. 
3. Generic Use 
¶30  Generic use of a trademark is the use of a symbol to indicate a type or class of 
goods rather than a source of goods.46  Genericide is the process by which repeated use of 
one source’s trademarked term to label a class or type of good or service provided by a 
number of suppliers.  Generic use of one source’s trademark diminishes its ability to 
identify that single source.47  Chrysler Corporation, the owner of the Jeep trademark for 
off-road vehicles, and Xerox Corporation, owner of the Xerox mark for photocopiers, 
 
45 This advertisement appeared in a periodical published in the United Kingdom. THE TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, 
at 8–9.  It contained a cartoon illustrating the firing of the economic ministers of the member nations at the 
2009 London Summit meetings of the G20 with the title “EXPERIENCE MATTERS:  You’re all fired.” 
46 A “generic” term is the common descriptive name of a product or service. See San Francisco Arts & 
Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 531 n.7 (1987) (“Because a generic name by 
definition does not distinguish the identity of a particular product, it cannot be registered as a trademark 
under the Lanham Act.”); see also Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) 
(“A generic term is one that refers to the genus of which the particular product is a species.”). 
47 Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Where the majority of the relevant 
public appropriates a trademark term as the name of a product (or service), the mark is a victim of 
‘genericide’ and trademark rights generally cease.  Such genericide can occur ‘as a result of a trademark 
owner’s failure to police the mark, resulting in widespread usage by competitors leading to a perception of 
genericness among the public, who sees many sellers using the same term.’”) (citing 2 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:1 (2007)). 
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risked genericide by such generic uses of their symbols.  As a policy matter, the issue is 
whether the law should extend exclusive rights to prevent generic uses of a mark. 
¶31  The accumulation of individual generic uses is congesting.  For example, 
simultaneous use by other suppliers of off-road vehicles diminishes the benefits Chrysler 
and consumers obtain from the source-indicating information associated with the Jeep 
symbol.  Fortunately for these suppliers and perhaps due to their efforts, the term SUV 
came to be the generic name for lightweight, off-road vehicles and people increasingly 
use the verb “to photocopy” instead of “to Xerox.”  TiVo Inc., which supplies the TiVo 
brand DVR, has a special section of its website devoted to preventing generic use by 
encouraging use of the mark as a singular adjective and discouraging use of the mark as a 
noun, as a verb, or in a possessive form.48 
4. Descriptive Use 
¶32  Finally, there is potentially congesting descriptive use of a term.  The symbol 
“Cadillac” conveys more information than simply the name of the supplier, General 
Motors.  Due undoubtedly to GM’s marketing efforts, “Cadillac” also conveys 
information about the size and luxury of products bearing the mark.  A consumer may, 
however, refer to his huge, shiny, stainless steel outdoor grill as “the Cadillac of grills,” 
characterizing it as being as big and fancy a grill as one can buy. 
¶33  This would be a descriptive rather than referential use of the term.  It does not refer 
to General Motors’ cars or to luxury cars generally, but rather follows a linguistic custom 
of using “Cadillac” in this adjectival way.  General Motors has created a linguistic device 
that communicates luxury in general.  This customary use is unlikely to blur the source-
indicating meaning of “Cadillac” unless consumers used the mark to refer to the 
luxurious qualities of other luxury cars as well, which could potentially result in 
genericide.49 
 
48 Trademark Rules-US, TIVO.COM, 
http://www.tivo.com/assets/pdfs/policies/20101215_Trademark_Rules_Legal_Resource_US_FINAL.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 29, 2011).  The website includes, inter alia, the following advice: 
Trademarks are singular.  Because a trademark is an adjective, it should never be used in the 
plural form.  Instead, when necessary, the generic noun can be used as a plural. 
 
Example: Correct:  I want two TiVo® DVRs. 
   Incorrect:  I want two TiVos. 
 
Trademarks are never verbs.  It is never permissible to use any of our trademarks as verbs. 
 
Example: Correct:  I want to record “Desperate Housewives”” on the TiVo® DVR. 
   Incorrect:  I want to TiVo “Desperate Housewives.” 
 
Trademarks are never possessive. 
 
Example: Correct:  The TiVo® remote control 
   Incorrect:  TiVo’s remote control 
49 See Barnes, supra note 2, at 28–35 (discussing customary, referential, and proprietary uses of 
trademarks). 
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¶34  There are other well-known descriptive uses of trademarks.  First, consider two 
examples of classic descriptive use.  Suppliers of non-competing goods might use the 
word “apple” to describe their applesauce, cake, or fritters, despite Apple Inc.’s use of the 
mark in connection with computers and consumer electronics.  Despite one company’s 
senior source-indicating use of “Micro Colors” in connection with its tattooing ink, a 
competing supplier of ink might use the term “micro colors” to describe the fine quality 
of its dyes.50  Because the symbols are employed in both classic descriptive and source-
indicating ways, the source-indicating meaning of any particular use becomes unclear. 
¶35  Second, there is comparative descriptive use.51  Suppliers of competing goods 
might use the Apple mark comparatively, to inform consumers that their computers are 
cheaper, faster, and more beautiful than those supplied by Apple.  A comparative 
descriptive user of another’s marks is using the mark to identify a competing source of 
goods with the ultimate objective of describing its own goods.  Both the classic 
descriptive and the comparative descriptive uses of trademark have the potential to be 
congesting, to diminish the source-indicating benefit of the trademark information, 
particularly if the descriptive use also causes some confusion about the source of the 
goods.  As a policy matter, the question is whether the law should permit free access to 
marks for descriptive purposes or extend exclusive rights to cover descriptive use. 
III. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS:  CONVENTIONAL WISDOM AND THE NET BENEFIT APPROACH 
¶36  Public goods theory and the theory of exchange of private goods offer normative 
and descriptive principles for determining the optimal level of supply of public goods.  
The first three of these principles are well known, apply to public goods generally, and 
are discussed only briefly here in order to set the background for a net benefit approach to 
policy analysis.52  They include the short-run allocative efficiency principle that the 
optimal level of output of private goods is where price equals marginal cost, the 
allocative efficiency principle for public goods that the optimal level of supply is where 
the summed value of all consumers’ values equal marginal cost, and the perfect price 
discrimination principle.  Part III-A discusses these principles. 
A. Conventional Economic Principles 
¶37  Conventional economic principles provide little, if any, practical guidance for 
resolving questions about the proper scope of intellectual property law.  As I have argued 
elsewhere in the pure public goods context,53 a “net benefit” analysis provides a more 
useful tool.  This approach looks at the incentive effects of changes in legal rules, in order 
to address the problem of insufficient incentives provided by marginal cost pricing for 
pure public goods.  It also looks at the access benefits of changes in legal rules, in order 
to recognize the benefits simultaneously realized by many consumers sharing a public 
 
50 This example is taken from KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 
(2004). 
51 This comparative use is also referred to as nominative use. See Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and 
the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 808 (2009). 
52 For a more detailed treatment of these basic principles, see Barnes, supra note 3. 
53 Id. 
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good.  Part III-B discusses that rule, while Parts III-C and III-D apply it.  The 
conventional economic principles do, however, identify tradeoffs that form the 
foundation for intellectual property law analysis. 
1. The “Price Equals Marginal Cost” Principle 
¶38  From the theory of private exchange come normative and descriptive principles that 
identify the optimal prices consumers should pay in the short-run and the optimal level of 
revenues for competitive firms in the long run.  The fundamental principle of allocative 
efficiency states that the price for a good should equal the marginal (incremental) cost of 
supplying a good to an additional consumer and that prices to all consumers should be 
uniform.54  Following the price equals marginal cost rule promotes a normative objective.  
It states that all consumers who are willing and able to give up enough wealth to cover 
the value of the resources consumed in supplying the good should receive the good.55 
¶39  Consumers will actually receive the good supplied at a price equal to marginal cost, 
however, only if the suppliers earn enough revenue to cover their average costs of 
production in the long run.56  Less revenue is insufficient to encourage firms to remain in 
the business.  In competitive markets under conventional assumptions, a uniform price 
for private goods equal to the marginal cost of supplying the final consumer produces 
revenues sufficient to provide a normal economic profit and an efficient allocation of 
resources.57 
¶40  The economic model describing how markets can both supply all consumers who 
value the good at more than its cost of supply and provide sufficient return to encourage 
producers applies only to private goods, which, because they are rivalrous, have a 
positive marginal cost of supply.  By contrast, the marginal cost of supplying another 
 
54 Marginal cost is the additional (marginal) cost of supplying another unit of a good.  In a competitive 
equilibrium, all consumers pay a price equal to the marginal cost of supplying the final unit. JAMES F. 
RAGAN, JR. & LLOYD B. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 522 (1990). 
55 JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 481 (3d ed. 1984).  In markets for private goods, 
a price equal to the marginal cost of supplying the good efficiently allocates resources to production of that 
good.  Such a price results in a proper incentive to a supplier of goods because that price allows the supplier 
to cover its costs including a normal economic profit.  Such a price also results in a proper level of supply 
as measured by a benefit/cost analysis.  The benefit a buyer obtains from acquiring the good is measured by 
the buyers’ willingness and ability to pay for the good.  The cost in the balance is the cost of the resources 
consumed by the supplier providing the good.  The normative parts of this explanation are the assertions 
that revenues sufficient to cover costs provide a “proper” incentive and that the resulting level of supply of 
the good is the “proper” level.  All of the economics of competitive markets for private goods is based on 
the price equals marginal cost equality and the assumptions about the desirability of allocative efficiency. 
56 See Barnes, supra note 3, at 111, 111 n.66 (“The marginal costs of supplying another consumer are 
generally positive for private goods.  Marginal costs are generally positive, because sharing a unit of the 
good that has already been provided is not feasible, as it is for a non-rivalrous public good.  Another unit 
must be produced.  In a properly functioning, perfectly competitive market, those positive prices cover 
producers’ costs of production.  The sum of marginal costs for all consumers and the fixed costs (costs that 
do not vary with the amount produced) equals the total cost of production.  Because marginal costs are the 
addition costs of producing each unit, staring with the first, the additional costs of producing the first and 
all subsequent units plus the fixed costs incurred to start up in the first place equals the total costs.  The 
costs of supplying each consumer with his or her own private goods mount up because consumption is 
rivalrous; each person consumes individually.”) (footnotes omitted). 
57 See supra note 55. 
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consumer with a non-rivalrous public good, such as intellectual property information, is 
zero.58  Revenues earned at a price equal to the zero marginal cost will not be sufficient to 
cover costs and provide incentives to produce.  The allocative efficiency objective and 
the goal of providing sufficient incentives to supply cannot both be met by market 
provision of intellectual property information. 
¶41  This model is further complicated by consideration of impure public goods.  The 
marginal cost to consumers of having a partially rivalrous good made available to 
another consumer is, at some point, positive because the additional consumer’s use 
imposes costs on others by decreasing the utility of the good to them.  While positive 
prices for purely private goods may be enough to provide incentives to suppliers, there is 
no similar assurance that pricing impure public goods at a level equal to marginal costs 
will do so.  Thus, this first rule from exchange theory, that price should equal marginal 
cost, cannot alone determine the efficient amount of provision of pure or impure public 
goods to be supplied in a free market. 
2. The “Summed Valuations” Principle 
¶42  From public finance theory comes a variation on the price equals marginal cost rule 
describing the optimal level of supply of public goods.  According to this rule an 
additional unit of a public good should be supplied as long as the sum of the total 
amounts all consumers are willing and able to pay for another unit of the good exceeds 
the cost of supplying that additional unit.59  This summation principle reflects a change 
from considering the benefits a single additional consumer would be willing and able to 
pay for a rivalrous good to considering the willingness and ability of all consumers to 
benefit from a non-rivalrous good. 
 
58 Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Bundles of Joy: The Ubiquity and Efficiency of Bundles in New 
Technology Markets, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 19–20 (2009) (recognizing that the zero marginal 
cost, normally thought to describe information goods, highlights the challenge of supplying information 
through a private market).  Describing patent law, the authors state: 
Inventions are nonrival goods.  Trade secrets can make inventions private property and a 
patent can secure an invention as private property for a limited time.  Either of these forms of 
protection provides incentives for inventors and a means of recovering the costs of inventing.  
Patent law further provides a context and an incentive for disclosure of an invention.  Under 
either form of protection, an inventor will capture a return to invention by charging a price for 
its use that is greater than the marginal cost of using the idea, which generally would be zero.  
That price may be explicit, in the form of a royalty, or implicit in the form on an elevated 
price for a good that embodies the invention.  Any price greater than zero creates a marginal 
welfare loss because some useful applications of the idea are not made.  This tradeoff 
between incentives to invent and efficiency in use is well known. 
Id. at 22. 
59 CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 7, at 23–24.  The benefits one person derives from production of 
another unit is measured by the additional resources he would be willing to give up to consume the good.  
In economics, this is the marginal rate of substitution, MRS, between the resources the person would give 
up and the good in question.  Because of non-rivalry, the total benefit from an additional unit of a public 
good is the sum of everyone’s MRS, that is, ΣMRSi for all individual consumers.  The optimum is reached 
where ΣMRSi = MC, the marginal cost of production.  Thus, the demand for a public good is determined by 
summing the benefits each person derives from the provision of a single unit of the good.  For private 
goods, the optimum is reached where MRSi, the marginal rate of substitution for a single individual, equals 
the marginal cost, MRSi = MC.  Thus, the demand for a private good is determined by summing the 
number of units demanded by consumers at a particular price. 
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¶43  Public finance theory was developed in the context of collective provision of public 
goods, where the government produced or paid for the production of goods from tax 
revenues and determined consumers’ preferences through voting and the political 
process.60  While the summation principle accurately describes the optimal level of 
collective supply, it fails to describe how private suppliers in a market determine the 
quantity for which people are willing and able to pay.  If people can share non-rivalrously 
and cannot be excluded from consumption, they have an incentive to conceal their 
preferences and their demand for public goods.61  This was not a problem for public 
finance theory because the voting process was divorced from the consumption process.  
The summation principle is of limited utility to the private provision of public goods, 
generally, because of the demand revelation problem and to impure public goods, in 
particular, because equating the sum of people’s willingness to pay and the marginal cost 
is inappropriate where the marginal cost varies as more users are added, that is, when 
goods are partially rivalrous. 
3. The “Price Discrimination” Principle 
¶44  Also from the theory of private exchange is the observation that if private suppliers 
could perfectly price discriminate, markets could supply an allocatively efficient level of 
public goods.62  Perfect price discrimination requires individualized pricing, with each 
consumer being charged a price reflecting his willingness and ability to pay.63  It also 
 
60 Public finance theory is based on the assumption that tax revenues paid for provision, and voting and 
political process led to demand revelation.  Professor Paul A. Samuelson, who first articulated the 
principles of public goods theory in the public finance context, viewed the political process as the way in 
which consumer preferences are revealed to fiscal authorities who would finance public goods expenditures 
from tax revenues. Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 13, at 387–89; see also supra note 13 and 
accompanying text. 
61 Id. at 33; see also CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 7, at 24 (“The non-excludability property of pure 
public goods induces individuals to undercontribute to provision in the belief that they can rely on the 
contributions of others.”). 
62 Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON. 293, 293 (1970). 
63 Perfect price discrimination means individualized prices according to willingness and ability to pay. See, 
e.g., Conley & Yoo, supra note 16, at 1815; F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual 
Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 
327, 422–23 (2006); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 
85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 727 (2001); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright’s Price Discrimination Panacea, 21 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 387, 451 (2008); Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 
2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 221 (2008).  Variations on this rule suggest pricing mechanisms that enable 
suppliers to cover their average costs by allocating fixed costs among consumers according to their 
willingness and ability to pay for the total quantity supplied and their elasticities of demand.  Public finance 
economists were concerned with how to structure taxation to pay for the production of public goods in the 
least distortionate way. See Erik Lindahl, Just Taxation—A Positive Solution, in CLASSICS IN THE THEORY 
OF PUBLIC FINANCE 168 (Elizabeth Henderson trans., Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T. Peacock eds., 1958) 
(describing a financing structure in which different consumers are charged different prices based on their 
marginal valuations of the total quantity, thus bearing a different proportion of the fixed costs); F.P. 
Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47, 58–59 (1927) (describing a pricing 
structure in which fixed costs are allocated among buyers based on the elasticity of their demand, with 
those buyers with the least elastic demand bearing the heaviest burden). 
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requires that public goods be perfectly excludable, which is usually not true; otherwise 
people who do not pay will enjoy the benefits of the non-rivalrous good without paying.64 
¶45  Individualized pricing theoretically resolves the problems of supplying an 
allocatively efficient amount of a non-rivalrous good and allowing the supplier to attempt 
to earn a profit by charging each user a price that corresponds to the amount that 
individual is willing and able to pay for the good.  Thus, a user who values the good only 
slightly pays a small price, while a user who values it highly pays a high price.  Everyone 
who attaches any positive value is provided access and the supplier earns revenues for 
providing the good.  As a normative matter, the distribution of wealth changes 
dramatically under individualized pricing, compared to free access or uniform pricing; 
some find this change objectionable.  This normative objection does not mean the 
allocation of resources is inefficient, however, as long as this type of price discrimination 
is more than a theoretic possibility. 
¶46  The realities of the ways markets function, including the difficulty in preventing 
arbitrage, make price discrimination impractical.  Information about works of art, how to 
build inventions, and the meaning of source-indicating symbols is easily exchanged.  
While there is some ability for suppliers to charge different consumers different prices 
(e.g., airlines, hotels, and wherever there is individualized bargaining as in intellectual 
property licensing), those prices may only imperfectly reflect the benefits people obtain 
from the supply because that information is generally unavailable to sellers.65  A buyer 
may be willing and able to pay more for her airline tickets, for instance, but if she is a 
wealthy retired person who can plan ahead, she can still take advantage of discount fares.  
Even if a seller could accurately assess the maximum one buyer was willing to pay, it is 
difficult in many cases to prevent arbitrage, that is, resale from the buyer who valued it 
less to a buyer who values it more.66  The price discrimination solution is impractical to 
implement where there is inability to exclude, to obtain accurate information about 
people’s preferences, or to prevent resale. 
¶47  Thus, none of the conventional approaches to determining the optimal output of 
intellectual property and, therefore, the optimal scope of intellectual property protection 
are helpful.  The price equals marginal cost rule provides insufficient incentives for the 
production of public goods; insufficient information is available in a market (or perhaps 
 
64 See Demsetz, supra note 62, at 295. 
65 Professors Conley and Yoo conclude that “there is no practical, real-world, incentive-compatible way to 
induce consumers to use prices to signal the intensity of their preferences.” Conley & Yoo, supra note 16, 
at 1810; see also Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 13, at 388 (“However, no decentralized pricing 
system can serve to determine optimally these levels of collective consumption. . . .  [I]t is in the selfish 
interest of each person to give false signals, to pretend to have less interest in a collective consumption 
activity than he really has, etc.”). 
66 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) (“To make price discrimination work, 
however, the seller must be able to control arbitrage.  An air carrier sells tickets for less to vacationers than 
to business travelers, using advance purchase and Saturday-night-stay requirements to distinguish the 
categories.  A producer of movies segments the market by time, releasing first to theaters, then to pay-per-
view services, next to the videotape and laserdisc market, and finally to cable and commercial TV.  
Vendors of computer software have a harder task.  Anyone can walk into a retail store and buy a box.  
Customers do not wear tags saying ‘commercial user’ or ‘consumer user.’  Anyway, even a commercial-
user-detector at the door would not work, because a consumer could buy the software and resell to a 
commercial user.”). 
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anywhere) to apply the summation rule; and the price discrimination rule is normatively 
objectionable and impractical.  An alternative approach is necessary. 
B. The Net Benefit Approach Generally 
¶48  For the reasons discussed above, the three conventional principles from pure public 
goods theory and private exchange theory do not provide a rule for defining the scope, 
extent, and duration of rights so that a private market can supply the optimal level of 
impure public goods.  To address the implications of potential impurities among 
intellectual property public goods, this Article uses a variation on a traditional cost-
benefit analysis.  Increased free access may be treated as a cost, because it decreases 
revenues available to encourage creative activity, or as a benefit, because it increases 
benefits people derive from information already produced, as well as derivative 
information, new information whose creation was made possible by the free access.  
Similarly, increasing exclusive rights may be viewed as a cost, in terms of diminished 
benefits derived by users, or a benefit, in terms of increased incentives to create new 
information.67  The net benefit approach considers whether the benefits from choosing 
one alternative, increased free access, outweigh the benefits from choosing the other, 
increased exclusive rights. 
¶49  The net benefit approach is an incrementalist or marginalist approach in that it 
evaluates the desirability of changes in legal rules—i.e., increases in rights or increases in 
free access.  This type of evaluation is, of course, what courts do when they decide cases 
that impact rights and access, what Congress does when it amends intellectual property 
statutes, and what scholars do when deciding what legal policy is preferable from a 
public goods perspective.  In application, the effect of increasing rights depends on 
whether the expanded rights increase incentives to create information.  The effect of 
increasing access depends on whether the increased access results in increased benefits 
from consuming the information or using it to create new information.  The “net benefit” 
approach recognizes that incentives and access both have the potential to produce 
benefits and both can be viewed as costs: 
An increase in exclusive rights to intellectual property is justified only when the 
value of increased creative activity resulting from increased incentives is greater 
than the value of the benefits lost from reduced access. 
 
67 Intellectual property scholars who explicitly describe goals for the optimal structure of intellectual 
property law from a public goods perspective often use the language of cost/benefit analysis. Landes & 
Posner, supra note 6, at 476; see Barnes, supra note 3, at 120 (“Paraphrasing and generalizing from 
Professor Landes and Judge Posner’s description of the optimal term of copyright protection, the rule for 
balancing incentives could be as follows:  [T]he optimal level of intellectual property protection is 
determined by balancing at the margin the incentive effects of broader rights against the administrative 
and access costs arising from the public goods aspect of intellectual property.  Landes and Posner were 
focusing on the incremental advantages of increasing incentives.  They argue that benefits arose from 
increased creative activity while the costs resulted from decreased access.  One could equally balance at the 
margin the benefits from increased access against the costs of broader rights.”) (citing Landes & Posner, 
supra note 6, at 476) (footnotes omitted). 
Vol. 9:8] David W. Barnes 
 551 
An increase in access to intellectual property is justified only when the value of 
the benefits resulting from increased access is greater than the value of decreased 
creative activity resulting from decreased incentives.68 
¶50  A balance that is suitable for pure public goods may be inappropriate for impure 
public goods.  Increased access may, by definition, diminish the utility others obtain from 
provision of the intellectual property information if the information is partially rivalrous.  
Increased rights may not lead to increased incentives to create information if the 
intellectual property is partially excludable without formal protection, and existing 
revenues are sufficient to cover costs.69  This Part III discusses and applies rules for 
applying the net benefit test to impure public goods. 
¶51  The incentives/access question involves a balance.  If goods are partially rivalrous, 
increasing exclusive rights is justified only if the value of creative activity resulting from 
doing so exceeds the value of the benefits arising from retaining access.  The following 
Sections C and D apply this general conclusion to intellectual property issues arising in 
copyright and trademark law, respectively, and find that partial rivalrousness only 
sometimes requires stronger intellectual property protections. 
C. Applying the Net Benefit Approach to Congestible Copyrights 
¶52  The net benefit approach usefully addresses the policy implications of 
strengthening rights to prevent congestion externalities in copyright.  When an 
individual’s consumption of a good does detract, even in the slightest, from the 
consumption opportunities available for others, the cost of extending access to that 
individual is greater than zero.  This is potentially true for all of the congestible goods 
examples discussed in Part II.  The economics literature on impure public goods 
concludes that, for an efficient allocation of resources, the price an individual should pay 
for the opportunity to consume a good depends on the costs her consumption imposes on 
others.70  This concept limits the free-access norm, which claims that if the marginal cost 
of supply is zero, the price should be zero.71  In markets for private goods, the marginal 
cost is the cost of additional resources needed to supply the good to an additional 
consumer.  In markets for impure public goods, marginal cost is the cost imposed on 
others “in terms of the reduced benefits due to congestion or incompatibility”72 resulting 
from the supply to an additional consumer. 
 
68 Barnes, supra note 3, at 122. 
69 Jeffrey L. Harrison offers an analysis of incentives from the creator’s perspective stating that “as long as 
the creative effort is put forward, there is no need to incur costs to protect benefits beyond this minimum 
[necessary to cover costs].” Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Positive Externalities Approach to Copyright Law: 
Theory and Application, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 14 (2005).  He argues that the creator’s earnings above 
average cost do not inspire extra creative effort so they are “irrelevant to the author’s decision-making.” Id. 
70 See generally Todd Sandler & John T. Tschirhart, The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey, 
18 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1481, 1487–88 (1980).  The model presented by these authors permits the amount 
of congestion to vary by the intensity of each person’s use. Id. at 1488 n.14; see also Demsetz, supra note 
62, at 293 (“[T]he payment of different prices for the same good is consistent with competitive equilibrium 
if the good is a public good.”). 
71 See discussion supra Part III-A. 
72 Sandler & Tschirhart, supra note 70, at 1487. 
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¶53  In the intellectual property context, the general rule of charging prices according to 
costs users impose on others73 means different access rules for different types of users.74  
Because non-rivalrous users of information impose no costs on others, they ought to have 
free access to the information.  According to economic theory, partially rivalrous users 
ought to pay for the costs their use imposes.75  Because intellectual property is provided 
by markets, however, the net benefit rule applies, rather than the public finance rule of 
charging different prices to different consumers. 
¶54  The idea of different access rules for different users is familiar to intellectual 
property law where fair use doctrines apply.76  But intellectual property law supports, 
rather than penalizes, such uses.  People who use another’s copyrighted expression to 
criticize, parodize, or transform it or use another’s trademark in unfavorable comparative 
advertising interfere with the value of the expression or symbol.  Intellectual property law 
protects those uses because the law values access more than the benefits that would result 
from stronger exclusive rights. 
¶55  In the public finance context, suppliers’ costs of production are covered by tax 
revenues rather than market prices.  In the public finance context, the government could, 
theoretically, set the optimal amount of production by paying for it out of tax revenues.  
There is no interplay between incentives and access as in a competitive market in which 
increased revenues might or might not produce greater output of creativity and any 
increased output might have great or little social value.  Taking incentive effects into 
account may alter the simple policy prescription of increasing rights to get more 
creativity. 
¶56  Users of well-known original and creative expressions of ideas may dilute the 
impression created by author in ways both beneficial and harmful to both the creator and 
the public.  From an impure public goods perspective, the net benefit of any such 
congesting use ought to be assessed in terms of its impact on the benefits derived by other 
users and in terms of its impact on authors’ incentives to produce intellectual property 
information.  The two impacts reflect the benefits of free access and of exclusive rights to 
 
73 See supra text accompanying note 70. 
74 See Sandler & Tschirhart, supra note 70, at 1488 (describing crowding as producing a reduction in the 
good’s quality, which may assume a variety of forms, such as poorer views, lost time, and less comfortable 
conditions).  When the level of provision of a good is constant, increases in the utilization of the good by an 
additional member increases congestion or crowding, thereby imposing costs on others that must be 
considered in balancing whether the additional contribution to the provision of the good by that additional 
member is worthwhile. Id. at 1489.  The model presented by these authors permits the amount of 
congestion to vary by the intensity of heterogeneous users’ use (the amount of crowding may differ among 
individuals), a class of cases of which incompatible uses is an extreme. Id. at 1488 n.14.  In models of 
impure or “club” goods, economists take into account that there may be positive benefits of increasing the 
numbers of homogenous users over some range to reflect “a pure taste for association.” Id. at 1491.  It may 
also be that there are unlikely to be enough simultaneous users of a particular good that the point of 
congestion is ever reached (in effect, giving the good the character of a pure public good).  These would be 
examples of “potentially” congestible goods. 
75 Id. at 1489. 
76 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2009) (establishing the fair use rules applied in trademark); 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2006) (establishing the United States’ copyright law’s fair use principles).  Both the trademark and 
copyright fair use rules permit some types of users free access to information even during the duration of 
exclusive rights. 
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partially rivalrous goods, respectively.  This section considers first the policy treatment of 
congestion of famous, iconic works. 
1. Incentive Effects 
¶57  It is hard to envision any harm to incentives from blurring, congesting uses of 
famous, iconic, copyrighted works.  Any effect of congestibility on the creator’s income 
from blurring iconic images from literature, film, or the arts is likely to come only after 
the creator has received more than sufficient return on investment to have induced the 
effort.  Professor Mark Lemley considered the potential blurring of the iconic images of 
Mickey Mouse, Barbie, and Scarlett O’Hara.77  While the Disney Corporation, the Mattel 
Corporation, and the estate of Margaret Mitchell would naturally prefer more revenue 
from their creations, there is no reason to think that the revenues obtained during the 
evolution and duration of the fame was insufficient from an incentives viewpoint.  The 
fame itself suggests the likelihood that there was sufficient return.78  While the incentive 
to create the work in the first place may require exclusive rights of limited duration, 
copyright congestibility offers no incentives-based justification for extending the term. 
¶58  The analysis of congestibility in the simple overuse case, without the blurring that 
results from transformative changes in image, is somewhat different.  The availability of 
multiple copies of a work may diminish the uniqueness of the original.  The appeal of the 
artist may diminish from overuse, limiting demand for his work.  But during the 
copyright term, the artist already has the right to control reproduction.  While the artist 
must be able to exclude copiers to prevent overuse during the copyright term, the 
potential of overuse resulting from his own reproduction is the creator’s problem, similar 
to the problem of any producer trying to maximize profits in a competitive market.  The 
creator’s complaint that he reproduced too many copies and over-exposed his own work 
does not engender sympathy.  The possibility that copiers will “congest” the image after 
that period has expired provides no incentives justification for extending the duration of 
exclusive rights if the term has been set properly in the first instance. 
¶59  Thus, in the case of both iconic and other creative works, there must be an 
opportunity to earn a sufficient return in the first place.  In terms of the net benefit rule, 
increases in exclusive rights are appropriate to encourage additional creative activity as 
long as the social value of that additional activity exceeds benefits that would flow from 
free access.  If incentives resulting from exclusive rights are needed to spur the initial 
creative activity, there would be no information to access without some initial exclusive 
rights.  Thus, there is a justification for exclusive reproduction, distribution, and 
derivative works rights for a limited copyright term, as current law provides.79  The 
incentives explanation provides no justification for extending exclusive rights beyond 
that minimum, particularly not for iconic, congestible copyrightable expressions. 
 
77 Lemley, supra note 2, at 145–46. 
78 Mark Lemley observes that demand for such figures is likely to be reduced only for that “subset of works 
that are so extremely well known that they have become cultural icons around which public expectations 
have crystallized.” Id at 145. 
79 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 302–305. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R T Y  [ 2 0 1 1  
 
 554
2. Effects on Consumption 
¶60  The original congestibility argument of Landes and Posner was based, however, on 
harm to users rather than detrimental incentives effects on creators.  They argued that the 
image created by the expression could be better maintained by extending the duration of 
exclusive rights, thereby protecting consumers who rely on the stability of the meaning of 
cultural icons.80  Consumers’ willingness to pay for iconic symbols may be reduced if 
their meaning is blurred.  Here, we are not concerned with the potential decline in 
revenues to the Disney Corporation, but with the potential detriment to a consumer, one 
who seeks a benefit from simultaneous use of the expression of an endearing and heroic 
mouse. 
¶61  Initially, observe that even if harm to users results from alternative expressions that 
blur the meaning of the original author’s work, the stability of expression argument 
applies only to the extent and duration of derivative rights, rather than to reproduction 
and distribution rights per se.81  By transforming or altering the expression, the alteration 
is based on or derived from the copyrighted work.  If copyright law prescriptively should 
and descriptively does acknowledge the interest in stability of expression, we might see 
evidence of this acknowledgment in fair use cases involving transformative works.  We 
do not.  The argument that authors ought to be able to control public interpretation of 
their expressions is so contrary to our understanding of the benefits from free access that 
it is difficult to accept.  It implies that the social value of effective critical commentary, 
comment, reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research82 is outweighed by the importance 
of the stable interpretation of a cultural expression.  Transformative use of another’s work 
is more likely to be considered fair use when courts apply the four factors of the fair use 
test.83  The stability of cultural expression does not favorably compare with altering 
cultural expression as part of the balancing process. 
¶62  In balancing the benefits of access and exclusion, stability is a legitimate value if 
there is evidence that users prefer it.  There is, however, no a priori reason to suspect that 
the social benefit of stability exceeds the social benefit of change.  Professor Thomas 
Cotter observed: 
It may be true that some consumers derive pleasure from stability of meaning, 
but others are just as likely to derive pleasure from changeability, or from future 
adaptations that cannot even be imagined at present. . . .  In much the same way, 
 
80 See Landes & Posner, supra note 6, at 487–88. 
81 See Lemley, supra note 2, at 145–46 (criticizing Landes and Posner’s reasoning). 
82 These values are reflected in the fair use provision of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
83 Id.; see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994) (“The first factor in a fair use 
enquiry is ‘the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is 
for nonprofit educational purposes.’ . . .  The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice 
Story’s words, whether the new work merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation or instead 
adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is ‘transformative.’  
Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, 
to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.  Such works 
thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright, 
and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like 
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”) (citations omitted). 
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the world may be a more interesting place and may offer a more diverse array of 
choices for consumers, if there are a variety of works available offering fresh 
perspectives on old characters and genres.84 
¶63  Suggesting a preference for a diverse array of fresh perspectives, Professor Lemley 
observed in this context that “there is substantial social value to allowing people to 
criticize and subvert cultural icons.”85  From either the incentives or access perspective, 
therefore, there seems little support for the congestion justification for extending 
copyright terms. 
D. Relaxing the Non-Rivalrousness Assumption:  Trademark Congestibility 
¶64  Evaluating the significance of trademark congestibility similarly requires 
consideration of the net benefit of restricting any such rivalrous use.  Again, this balance 
ought to be assessed in terms of its impact on the benefits derived by other users and in 
terms of its impact on authors’ incentives to produce intellectual property information.  
Given the differences among the four types of trademark uses that might affect incentives 
to produce and benefits from using trademark information discussed in Part II, separate 
analysis of each is appropriate. 
¶65  The net benefit rule applies to congestible uses of trademarks.  Analysis begins 
with the rule from the economics of impure public goods that the price an individual 
should pay for the opportunity to consume a good depends on the costs her consumption 
imposes on others.  But that rule must be tempered to apply to the intellectual property 
context, where a tradeoff considers the value of benefits resulting from stronger exclusive 
rights and associated increased incentives, on one hand, and the value of benefits 
resulting from weaker exclusive rights and associated increased access, on the other. 
1. Confusing Proprietary Use 
¶66 The analyses of congestible copyright and congestible trademark uses differ because the 
harm resulting from some congestible uses of trademark is greater than congestible uses 
of copyright and the argument for legal intervention is clearer.  Infringers of copyrights 
and patents may interfere with the revenues rights holders earn, but the information is 
likely to retain its utility.  Confusing proprietary users of another’s trademark, on the 
other hand, may interfere greatly with the utility of the information conveyed by the 
mark.  The mark owner has greater difficulty using the mark to indicate that she is the 
exclusive supplier of goods bearing that mark.  Consumers have greater difficulty 
identifying goods from that supplier by reference to the mark.  In addition to the adverse 
incentive effect on the mark owner from permitting congestible proprietary uses, there is 
a diminution in the utility of the mark to consumers as other competing suppliers use it as 
a source-indicator.  Thus, the focus of trademark law is properly on preventing confusing 
simultaneous source-indicating uses of marks. 
 
84 Thomas F. Cotter, Memes and Copyright, 80 TUL. L. REV. 331, 400–01 (2005). 
85 Lemley, supra note 2, at 145–46.  Lemley also argues that, if the availability of alternative expression 
limits demand for the author’s expression, it might be because people prefer the alternative expression, id., 
which would be evidence of the greater value of free access. 
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¶67  The law responds to this potentially severe congestion by imposing a cost on 
trademark infringers in accord with the economic theory of impure public goods.  This 
cost is, in some measure, tailored to the costs imposed by the congesting, confusing 
proprietary use.  Trademark monetary awards include, inter alia, revenues diverted from 
the trademark owner by the trademark infringer and profits earned by the infringer.86  
These damages reflect revenues the infringer earned from diminishing the utility of the 
intellectual property by its congesting use.  The infringer’s profits resulted from 
deceiving consumers, the first of two parties whose benefit from referential use of a 
clearer trademark symbol is lessened by the congesting use.  The reductions in revenues 
earned by the mark owner reflect harm to the second party, whose benefit from 
proprietary use of the trademark symbol is diminished. 
¶68  The award of injunctive relief87 against confusing proprietary use is also supported 
by the net benefit analysis.  The only benefits resulting from permitting free access to 
another’s mark by confusing proprietary users are likely to result from misrepresentations 
of the sources of goods.  The benefits resulting from exclusive rights to trademarks are 
the production of more information about sources, characteristics, and qualities of goods.  
Injunctions appropriately consider the costs and benefits of enjoining conduct, focusing 
on net benefits to society as well as to the parties.88  Trademark law reflects the 
prescriptive recommendations of the net benefit rule applied to impure public goods 
theory’s treatment of congestible public goods by allowing for recovery of lost profits, an 
accounting, and injunctive relief. 
2. Non-Confusing Proprietary Use 
¶69  Non-confusing proprietary use of another’s trademark has potential for blurring of 
the source-indicating power of a trademark.  Non-confusing proprietary uses might make 
it more expensive for the trademark owner to clarify its association with the mark, 
affecting incentives to create information.  Blurring might also decrease the utility of the 
information to consumers. 
¶70  Trademark protection of marks from non-confusing proprietary uses falls under the 
dilution provision of the Lanham Act, which is designed to prevent “the lessening of the 
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services.”89  The Supreme 
Court,90 Congress,91 and scholars92 traditionally conclude that the purpose of the dilution 
 
86 See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)(1) (2006) (allowing recovery of defendant’s profits); id. § 1117(a)(2) (allowing 
recovery of plaintiff’s losses). 
87 See id. § 1116 (allowing injunctive relief). 
88 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“According to well-established 
principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court 
may grant such relief.  A plaintiff must demonstrate:  (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, 
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; 
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”). 
89 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
90 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003) (“Unlike traditional infringement law, the 
prohibitions against trademark dilution . . . are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers.”). 
91 The legislative history of the Lanham Act dilution provisions reflects this concern:  “The concept of 
dilution recognizes the substantial investment the owner has made in the mark and the commercial value 
and aura of the mark itself, protecting both from those who would appropriate the mark for their own gain.” 
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provision is to protect mark owners’ investments rather than to protect consumers.  From 
this tradition, we might infer an interest in protecting a creator’s return on investment per 
se, rather than in promoting incentives or maintaining the benefits consumers obtain from 
the information, which are the concerns of public goods theory. 
i) Benefits of Exclusive Rights to Preventing Non-Confusing Uses 
¶71  To find an incentives argument for dilution law, there must be social value in any 
incentive effects created by the extension of exclusive rights.  Like the iconic expressions 
discussed in the section on copyright congestibility,93 however, the famous marks to 
which dilution law applies are likely already to have had significant return on their 
investment and to have significant incentive to continue to invest in the mark without 
regard to protection against blurring.  This suggests that the incentive effects of increased 
protection are likely to be small.  Marks that are not famous are, by definition, unlikely to 
be adopted by others with intent to benefit from the notoriety of the mark or to be blurred 
by others’ use.  The beneficial incentives effects of dilution law have not been considered 
in depth in the intellectual property literature. 
¶72  Any benefits to consumers from increasing exclusive rights should also be weighed 
in arguments supporting dilution protection.  Protection against confusing use in a 
traditional infringement action benefits consumers by ensuring that only one provider of a 
type of goods or services can use the mark proprietarily.  This exclusive use lowers 
consumers’ costs of locating desirable goods and may be an indication of the qualities 
and characteristics of the goods bearing the mark.94  Dilution law might have a similar 
salutary benefit.  Schechter’s focus was on arbitrary marks that had “added to rather than 
withdraw[n] from the human vocabulary,”95 marks that have social value.  Schechter 
believed that laws protecting against dilution would only apply to such marks:  words that 
 
CARLOS MOORHEAD, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT OF 1995, H.R. 
Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995) (quoting report prepared by Congressman Morehead, Chair of the 
Committee on the Judiciary). 
92 Frank Schechter, an early proponent of the dilution theory, asserted that “the vast expenditures in 
advertising” associated with making a mark famous justified the mark’s protection from noncompeting 
uses. See Karyn K. Ablin & Anil Koshy, A Matter of Opinion: Deciphering Dilution Under the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act, 20 MISS. C. L. REV. 61, 68, 68 n.48 (1999) (quoting Schechter, supra note 11, at 
830). 
93 See supra Part III-C. 
94 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in 
Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1225–26 (2007) (“In economic terms, trademarks contribute 
to economic efficiency by reducing consumer search costs.  Rather than having to inquire into the 
provenance and qualities of every potential purchase, consumers can look to trademarks as shorthand 
indicators.  Because this short-hand information is less expensive than detailed inquiries, consumers can 
more easily obtain and process it and will arguably become better informed, resulting in a more competitive 
market.  This system works, of course, only if consumers can trust the accuracy of trademarks, and this is 
where the law comes in.  By protecting established trademarks against confusing imitation, the law ensures 
a reliable vocabulary for communications between producers and consumers.  Both sellers and buyers 
benefit from the ability to trust this vocabulary to mean what it says.  Sellers benefit because they can 
invest in goodwill with the knowledge that others will not appropriate it.  Consumers benefit because they 
do not have to do exhaustive research or even spend extra time looking at labels before making a purchase; 
they can know, based on a brand name, that a product has the features they are seeking.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
95 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 429 (quoting Schechter, supra note 11, at 829) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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have “been associated in the public mind with a particular product” and “have created in 
the public consciousness an impression or symbol of the excellence of the particular 
product in question.”96 
¶73  The benefit to consumers of an exclusive right to prevent non-confusing proprietary 
uses may depend on how the trademark owner markets its goods.  Part II-B identified two 
situations in which blurring might occur, uses of famous marks to convey product 
information (the Cadillac mark conveying the message of luxury) and uses of famous 
marks to publicize the suppliers’ identity generally (Exxon and Schweppes ads promoting 
the suppliers themselves).  Consumer perceptions are relevant to measuring the benefits 
from exclusive use. 
¶74  If there are unlikely to be incentive effects from preventing diluting uses, the focus 
of dilution law must be on harm to consumers.  For there to be harm to consumers from 
non-confusing proprietary uses, there must be a diminution in the trademark/source 
association in consumers’ minds.97  Consumers’ benefit from trademarks is from that 
association.  For there to be a benefit from extending exclusive rights to prohibiting non-
confusing proprietary uses, the use must both create an association in consumers’ minds 
and diminish the association.  The boundaries of dilution protection might be set by 
considering the effect of a supplier’s non-confusing proprietary use on consumers’ 
referential use of the mark. 
¶75  The theoretical potential for a detrimental effect on consumers from dilution 
through non-confusing proprietary use has been discussed but the likelihood of an actual 
effect has not been well established.  Professor Lemley observed that “[t]he information 
consumers can obtain and process is in part a function of how clear the association 
between mark and product remains in their minds; ‘clutter’ therefore imposes real costs 
on consumers.”98  While he recognized that “the loss of the informational value of a 
famous trademark through crowding” is a real harm,99 Lemley observed that expansions 
in other trademark doctrines may already address this problem.100  According to 
Professor J. Thomas McCarthy, the economic argument that consumers could be harmed 
by congesting, blurring non-confusing uses of trademarks is that “this makes it harder for 
consumers to link that designation with a single source—the hallmark of a strong 
trademark.  Under this theory, dilution increases the consumer’s search costs by diffusing 
 
96 Id. at 429 n.10 (quoting Schechter, supra note 11, at 828–29) (internal quotation mark omitted). See 
generally Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 731 (2003) 
(emphasizing Schechter’s focus on protecting only unique marks). 
97 See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433 (“As the facts of that case demonstrate, such mental association will not 
necessarily reduce the capacity of the famous mark to identify the goods of its owner, the statutory 
requirement for dilution under the FTDA.”).  Although the holding in Moseley was superseded by statute, 
see Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (amending 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c) (1946)), the statutory amendment only changed the requirement of proof of “actual dilution” to a 
proof of a “likelihood of dilution,” not affecting the Supreme Court’s statement that dilution itself requires 
more than a mere association between the marks of the alleged infringer and the trademark owner. 
98 Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1704 
n.90 (1999). 
99 Id. at 1705 n.91. 
100 Id. at 1704 n.90 (citing Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising 
Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1722 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the identification power of that designation.”101  McCarthy concludes, however, that 
“[w]hether this is a significant risk in the real world is unknown and unproven.”102  Some 
scholars questions whether a trademark has ever actually been diluted.103 
¶76  The Exxon and Schweppes examples demonstrate corporate marketing of the 
supplier itself rather than marketing in connection with a product.104  While the supplier’s 
motivation is to market itself by making its famous name even more well known, 
corporate marketing is likely to be less informative that advertising that says something 
about the characteristics and qualities of a particular product or associates a source-
indicating device with a particular source.  No one argues that trademark law is designed 
to protect marketing devices per se, but rather it protects only the power of source-
indicating symbols.105  The lack of evidence of significant benefit to exclusion suggests 
little benefit to the dilution cause of action. 
a) Benefits from Free Access 
¶77  To consider the benefit to people, other than the mark owner, from free access, we 
might consider the impact of free access by non-confusing proprietary users on those 
users and on consumers who would use the non-confusing proprietary user’s mark 
referentially.  Non-competitors might adopt a famous mark so that some of the élan 
associated with the mark (luxury goods such as Cadillac cars or Wedgwood china) or 
recognizability of the mark (such as Victoria’s Secret) would rub off on them or increase 
their own visibility in the market for their goods. 
¶78  By free-riding on the investments of the mark owner, non-competitors might gain a 
market advantage and usefully inform consumers if the goods they are selling do indeed 
have the characteristics (e.g., luxury) of the mark owner’s goods.  This may be true for a 
seller of luxury homes using the Wedgwood mark, famously used in connection with fine 
china, though perhaps not for sellers of Cadillac dog food.  A rule prohibiting only 
misleading non-confusing proprietary uses might be desirable, but the Lanham Act 
prohibition on false advertising already covers those uses.106  Moreover, success in the 
 
101 J. Thomas McCarthy, Proving a Trademark has Been Diluted: Theories or Facts?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 
713, 727–28, 728 n.59 (2004) (“The economy is less when, because the trademark has other associations, a 
person seeing it must think for a moment before recognizing it as the mark of the product or service.”) 
(quoting Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 75 (1992)). 
102 Id. at 728. 
103 Kenneth L. Port, The “Unnatural” Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute 
Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 447–48 (1994) (“[T]he proponents of dilution have not 
established that trademarks are even susceptible to dilution.  No mark has ever actually, quantitatively been 
established to have been diluted.  If it had, we should be able to point to a specific trademark that was 
worth X before the entry of a newcomer but worth X minus Y after the entry of a non-competing and 
diluting newcomer.  Because there is none leads me to doubt even the existence of the idea of dilution.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
104 Scholars object to trademark rights in the absence of connection to a product or market. See, e.g., id. at 
466–67 (discussing trademark rights to words outside of their use indicating a particular product). 
105 See Barnes, One Trademark, supra note 16, at 3 (discussing the desirability of limiting the use of 
trademarks as marketing devices by suppliers of goods and services and emphasizing the use of marks to 
inform consumers about the source, qualities, and characteristics of goods). 
106 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006) (establishing a cause of action against any person “who . . . uses in 
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation 
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . in 
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market ought perhaps to depend on the merits of the suppliers’ goods and services 
themselves, rather than the spurious attachment of a label.  Also, courts regularly observe 
that the trademark owner’s reputation ought not to be under the control of others whose 
product quality may not be maintained.107  These considerations suggest that the benefits 
of free access to others’ famous marks are small. 
¶79  From a public goods perspective, allowing free-riding on a famous mark to obtain 
increased visibility does not create great social value and may have social detriments, 
especially if such free-riding is misleading.  If non-confusing adoption of another’s 
famous mark causes little harm and provides little benefit, it might still be a problem if it 
has negative incentive effects.  Negative effects of free-riding from non-confusing 
proprietary use have not been well-established in cases or commentary, however, and 
positive free access effects are minor, hypothetical, and questionable.  These positive 
effects from non-confusing proprietary use by suppliers and consumers have also not 
been considered in any detail in the scholarly or judicial literature. 
¶80  Balancing the incentive and access arguments leaves a weak and unproven case for 
trademark law protection against dilution of famous marks.  There is no reported decision 
in which any actual negative blurring effects of non-confusing proprietary use have been 
proved, except by circumstantial evidence, such as the exact identity of the owners mark 
and the mark the alleged diluter used.108  There are few, if any, dilution cases in which 
the plaintiff has failed to show that confusion was likely, with respect to the 
accompanying infringement claim, but successfully obtained an injunction based on 
evidence that blurring was likely.  The lack of evidence in situations where the plaintiff 
has incentive to produce evidence supports the conclusion that trademark congestion 
from blurring may be more of a hypothetical than real problem from a public goods 
perspective.  Blurring does not appear to be a problem from an impure public goods/net 
benefits perspective. 
3. Generic Use 
¶81  From a net benefits perspective, the question is whether a trademark owner should 
have an exclusive right to obtain or retain trademark rights in a generic term.  Generic use 
means use of a term to indicate a class or type of products or services.109  The benefits 
from allowing free access to generic terms are well established.  Suppliers who compete 
in the market created by or dominated by the mark owner need a way to identify the class 
of goods into which their products fall.  This situation was particularly clear in the 
 
commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic 
origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities”). 
107 See generally Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198 (D. Md. 1988) (citing other 
relevant cases) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
108 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003) (recognizing that direct proof of actual 
dilution (through consumer surveys) might be difficult, dilution might be proved through circumstantial 
evidence, as in cases where the junior and senior marks are identical); see also, e.g., Horphag Research Ltd. 
v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying that standard to find that the defendant had 
actually blurred the plaintiff’s trademark).  There is at least one recent case in which the court held that the 
diluting use was likely to cause consumers to have an unfavorable view of the mark because it was used in 
connection with a sex shop. 
109 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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Shredded Wheat case, where the expiration of patents left competitors and consumers at a 
competitive disadvantage if they could not use the term “shredded wheat,” theretofore 
used only by the plaintiff.110  The benefits from exclusive rights are only anti-competitive 
because the mark is, by definition, a product-class-identifier rather than a source-
identifier and, thus, can only prevent consumer choice.  Because the net benefits of 
access outweigh the net benefits of exclusive rights, the law should, and does, deny 
exclusive rights to generic terms. 
¶82  Trademark law prohibits source-indicating uses that may lead to genericide if they 
are likely to cause confusion,111 but does not prohibit “class-of-products-indicating” 
uses.112  Trademark law prohibits trademark rights in generic terms because they are not 
terms by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of 
others,113 and it permits cancellation of registered marks that have become generic.114  
The Lanham Act’s incontestability provisions,115 which provide a conclusive 
presumption of validity for other types of marks that have lost their source-indicating 
ability,116 deny this benefit to marks that have become generic.117  A trademark owner 
may object to source-indicating uses that lead to genericide, but once the mark is generic 
the owner loses its exclusive rights and, from a net benefits perspective, with good 
reason. 
4. Customary/Descriptive Use 
¶83  Some customary and descriptive uses may have identifiable negative effects on 
incentives, but for all such uses there are well-established and more significant benefits 
from free access.  A supplier who has chosen a term with some descriptive value as a 
source-indicator must demonstrate that the term has a primarily source-indicating 
meaning, rather than a product/service describing meaning to the public.118  Once the 
term is primarily source indicating, further descriptive use, particularly of the sort that 
 
110 Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 117–18 (1938). 
111 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (establishing causes of action for infringement of registered and 
unregistered trademarks, respectively); Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193–94 
(1985) (discussing lack of protection for generic terms or terms that had become generic). 
112 See Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 906 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Of course, trademark owners 
are free (and perhaps wise) to take action to prevent their marks from becoming generic and entering the 
public domain—e.g., through a public relations campaign or active policing of the mark’s use.  The 
Lanham Act itself, however, contains no provision preventing the use of a trademarked term in its generic 
sense.”); id. (citing Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 513–14 (7th Cir. 2002), for rejecting an attempt to 
extend the Lanham Act’s anti-dilution provisions “to enjoin uses of their mark that, while not confusing, 
threaten to render the mark generic”). 
113 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (denying registration to such marks); id. § 1127 (defining “trademark” and 
“service mark”). 
114 Id. § 1064(3). 
115 Id. § 1065. 
116 Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 196 (holding that merely descriptive terms registered because they had 
acquired distinctiveness that had become incontestable could not be challenged on the basis that they were 
merely descriptive). 
117 Id. at 193–94. 
118 Id. at 211 (discussing trademark user’s obligation to demonstrate secondary meaning, i.e., that the 
descriptive term has come to refer to the user’s goods); 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (permitting registration of 
marks that have become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce). 
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describes a competitor’s product (such as “micro colors”) has the potential to tip the 
primary significance of the term back towards its pre-source-indicating descriptive 
meaning.  This descriptive use diminishes the mark owner’s return on investment, 
potentially affecting incentives, and diminishes the benefits consumers might otherwise 
reap using the mark referentially. 
¶84  This diminution in incentives, however, only discourages suppliers from investing 
in descriptive source-indicating marks and favors investment in stronger suggestive, 
fanciful, or arbitrary marks.  Descriptive marks are advantageous from a marketing 
perspective because the mark immediately brings to the consumer’s mind a characteristic 
or quality of products or services of the type being supplied.  No one suggests that 
trademark law ought to protect marketing devices independently from their power as 
source-indicating devices.119  The law gives more protection to the stronger marks120 
because they have greater natural source-indicating potential and detract less from the 
natural meaning of words.  In sum, there is not much lost by discouraging the adoption of 
descriptive trademarks that others need to use in order to identify their goods. 
¶85  The gains associated with free access to descriptive terms are well known.  
Competitors must be able to describe their goods in order to inform consumers about the 
availability of alternatives to the mark owner’s goods, and consumers benefit from 
increased competition.121  The benefits from free access outweigh the benefits that would 
be obtained by extending exclusive rights to cover descriptive uses.  In descriptive use 
cases, courts have opined that suppliers who elect to use a descriptive term as a source-
indicator take the risk that others’ descriptive use will water down the source-indicating 
power of the symbol.122 
¶86  The arguments favoring permissive descriptive use may apply even more forcefully 
to comparative uses.  A competitor’s comparative use is descriptive because it uses 
another’s mark to describe the mark owner’s product for the purpose of comparison123 
(e.g., “our computers are faster than Apple computers”).  If it is clear whose products are 
 
119 Virgin Enters. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The trademark right does not protect the 
exclusive right to an advertising message—only the exclusive right to an identifier, to protect against 
confusion in the marketplace.”); see also, Barnes, One Trademark, supra note 16, at 3 (proposing 
limitations on trademark protection to minimize competitive harms resulting from unnecessary protection 
of marketing devices). 
120 Virgin Enters., 335 F.3d at 147–48 (“Thus, as a matter of policy, the trademark law accords broader 
protection to marks that serve exclusively as identifiers and lesser protection where a grant of exclusiveness 
would tend to diminish the access of others to the full range of discourse relating to their goods.”). 
121 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122 (2004) (“The common 
law’s tolerance of a certain degree of confusion on the part of consumers followed from the very fact that in 
cases like this one an originally descriptive term was selected to be used as a mark, not to mention the 
undesirability of allowing anyone to obtain a complete monopoly on use of a descriptive term simply by 
grabbing it first.”). 
122 Cosmetically Sealed Indus. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1997) (“So long 
as the defendants in good faith are using the phrase in its descriptive sense and prominently identifying the 
product with the defendants’ marks, the defendants incur no liability simply because the materials 
containing the descriptive phrase are so widely disseminated as to form some degree of association in the 
public’s mind between the phrase and the product.  That too is a risk the plaintiff took in selecting as its 
mark a phrase that was not only descriptive but readily recognized by consumers.”). 
123 Waco Int’l, Inc. v. KHK Scaffolding Houston Inc., 278 F.3d 523, 534 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Clearly, use of a 
mark for comparison or reference purposes falls under the category ‘descriptive’ as defined in 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1115(b)(4) . . . .”). 
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being compared, the source-indicating power of the mark owner’s symbol (Apple) is not 
weakened, competition is enhanced, and consumers’ ability to locate satisfactory goods is 
enhanced.  While the mark owner’s revenues may suffer from an unfavorable 
comparison, comparative use does not diminish the clarity of the signal; the informational 
benefit is not congested.  Similarly, customary descriptive use, such as “the Cadillac of 
BBQ grills,” is unlikely to impair and may enhance the source-indicating power of a 
mark when it provides informational content that transcends its use as a trademark.  The 
net benefit test confirms the logic of legal rules protecting descriptive and comparative 
uses of trademarks.124 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶87  The economics of public goods suggests that, when intellectual property 
information is provided by the market, weak exclusive rights may result in insufficient 
incentives to supply information, while strong exclusive rights may result in insufficient 
access to the information that is created.  The customary tools of public finance theory, 
from which public goods theory arose, and the economics of private markets do not 
provide practical guidance in resolving this balance when goods are non-rivalrous.  
Conventional theory does identify norms guiding our understanding of what needs to be 
considered in establishing private markets for non-rivalrous public goods.  The challenge 
for intellectual property law is to find the optimal balance between incentives and access. 
¶88  When applied to intellectual property law, it is apparent that some goods are not 
pure public goods at all, but are instead partially rivalrous.  Whatever policy prescriptions 
are appropriate for pure public goods must be modified to reflect that characterization, 
because the free access norm based on allocative efficiency does not apply.  The general 
theory of pure and impure public goods, having been developed in the context of public 
provision of goods paid for by taxes and demanded through the political process, has 
little direct relevance to market provision of pure or impure public goods.  A net benefit 
test weighs the benefits from strengthening exclusive rights and, alternatively, increasing 
public access to intellectual property information. 
¶89  The net benefit test can be used to evaluate policy prescriptions made by scholars 
who recognize that some intellectual property information has the characteristics of 
impure rather than pure public goods.  Scholarly discussions of copyright and trademark 
congestibility, for instance, suggest that some uses of copyrighted expressions and 
trademarked source-indicating symbols are partially rivalrous, apparently justifying 
increased exclusive rights, such as a lengthening of the term of copyright exclusivity or 
recognizing the right to prevent diluting trademark uses.  Applying the net benefits test to 
cases of congestible copyrights and famous trademarks, however, shows that the benefits 
of strengthening exclusive rights is small and, in any case, likely to be outweighed by the 
benefits of permitting free use.  On the other hand, where the potential for congestion is 
particularly high, such as when descriptive and generic terms are used as trademarks, the 
law already implicitly recognizes that the net benefits from access, allowing congesting 
uses, outweighs the net benefits from increasing exclusive rights.
 
124 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2006) (codifying the right to use of terms descriptively, fairly, and in good faith, even 
if those terms are trademarks of others). 
